We build up a di¤erential game to investigate the interplay between the quality of health care and the presence of an evolving disease in a duopoly where patients are heterogeneous along the income dimension. We prove unicity, stability and perfection of the open-loop Nash solution. Moreover, we identify the admissible parameter region wherein price regulation achieves the twofold objectives of ensuring cares to all patients and eradicating the disease.
Introduction
So far, the theoretical literature on the quality of health care has extensively dwelled on the analysis of the provision of health care in the framework of multidimensional product di¤erentiation combining vertical and horizontal dimensions (see Barros However, a feature common to all the contributions belonging to this stream of research is that patients are supposed to be identical in their capacity of paying for medical cares, i.e., this approach generally leaves aside the typical assumption of hedonic tastes inherent to the analysis of quality choice in the theory of industrial organisation, dating back to Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) . Additionally, the provision of health care is investigated in settings where the objective of health care, i.e., the disease, is only implicitly considered, so that these models could be interpreted as describing, in general, di¤erentiated industries where …rms are typically subject to price regulation.
To the best of our knowledge, Brekke et al. (2010) o¤er the …rst analysis of this issue in a dynamic game setup. Here, we set out with a twofold aim: to study the design of a health care regulation system where (i) the existence of a disease is explicitly accounted as a dynamic process, and (ii) patients di¤er in income and therefore also in their resulting willingness to pay for medical treatment.
We build up a dynamic duopoly with vertical di¤erentiation where a high and a low-quality hospital set their health care levels and the market can be partially covered, in the sense that some individual may not receive health care. In the model, hospitals set their quality level non cooperatively at every instant. The demands for high and low quality di¤er depending on patients' income. Finally, we interpret price regulation in this model as a …ne tuning device whereby the public agency adjusts prices so as to attain two goals: (a) ensure universal treatment, i.e., full market coverage, and (b) eradicate the disease.
The open-loop information structure is investigated …rst. Our results
show that there is a unique steady state equilibrium where hospitals provide vertically di¤erentiated services. We also single out the parametric condition required to ensure saddle point stability. Then, we show that there exists a unique vector of regulated prices ensuring indeed that every individual is cared for and the disease is completely eradicated. Finally, we model the feedback game to prove that the open-loop solution is in fact a degenerate feedback one, and therefore it is subgame perfect. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup is laid out in section 2. Section 3 describes the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Price regulation policy is in section 4. Section 5 brie ‡y characterises the feedback game. Concluding remarks are in section 6.
The model
We adopt a continuous time setup, where time is t 2 [0; T ) : We take a …nite horizon as we are interested in …nding out whether the disease can be eradicated in …nite time. To investigate the optimal provision of health services, we rely on a variant of the vertical di¤erentiation model with hedonic preferences originally due to Mussa and Rosen (1978) , where individuals are indexed by a marginal willingness to pay for health care 2 ; ; > 1: 1 Over such interval, the population is uniformly distributed with unit density, so that its size is equal to one. Two hospitals serve the market, each one being characterised by a di¤erent quality level. The instantaneous measure of health care quality is q i (t) ; i 2 fL; Hg, which is the control variable of hospital i. The price of quality i at any time t is constant at p i ; being regulated by the government or a public agency. For reasons that will become clear in the remainder, we allow for p H > p L :
By accessing the high-quality health service, an individual of type at-tains the following net instantaneous surplus:
where D (t) 0 measures the level or intensity of disease su¤ered by this individual at time t. Instead, if the same individual resorts to the inferior quality care, the resulting net surplus is:
where k 2 (0; 1) is a positive time-invariant parameter capturing the idea that gross satisfaction from receiving the low quality is lower. The third and last admissible case is that where an individual does not receive any health care; for the sake of simplicity, we set the corresponding utility level to zerowhich does not necessarily correspond to the death of the patient. To make sense of this normalisation, consider what follows. Parameter measures the individual taste for medical care in a hospital. If the patient is not being served, one may imagine that he/she receives some form of parental care at home, resulting in an alternative utility n (t) D (t) ; where n (t) measures the instantaneous amount of the (unmodelled) parental care. It su¢ ces to assume that n (t) = D (t) at all times to economise on the number of endogenous variables.
In line of principle, we admit the possibility that the poorest section of the population be priced out of health cares. Accordingly, we set up the model under partial coverage. 3 In order to construct the demand functions for the high-and low-quality services, we solve the indi¤erence conditions:
yielding
Hence, the demand functions are:
On the supply side, we assume hospitals to be pro…t-seeking units. Prices are being regulated over the entire horizon of the game by a public agency, whose objectives will be discussed in detail in the remainder. Hence, hospital i controls only the quality of its services q i (t) over time. The supply of health care entails the instantaneous cost i (t) = cx 2 i (t) ; while any other costs are assumed away. Therefore, the hospital's instantaneous pro…t function is:
The disease dynamics is represented by the following state equation:
where D (t) is the intensity of the disease at time t and the constant s > 0 measures the rate at which the disease intensi…es; parameter v > 0 measures instead the e¤ectiveness of health care. The maximum problem of hospital i can be formulated as follows:
subject to the state equation (8) and the initial condition
The discount rate > 0 is assumed to be the same for both …rms. The relative size of and s will play a key role in shaping our results. To this regard, it seems natural to assume < s in order for hospitals to attach a proper importance to the future of patients, which additionally spills over positively to the present value of the pro…t ‡ow.
where i (t) is the costate variable associated with the state D (t) ; under the initial condition D (0) = D 0 > 0; and the salvage value i (D (t)) is set equal to zero, for reasons that will be clari…ed later. We are setting ourselves out to prove:
The open-loop game yields a unique steady state equilibrium point, at
:
be a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. The necessary conditions are:
7 For the sake of brevity, henceforth we will omit the explicit indication of the time argument.
The associated transversality conditions require i (T ) = 0:
From (10-11), we may obtain both the dynamics of controls and the expressions of the optimal costates at any time. Solving (10-11) w.r.t. controls and di¤erentiating the resulting expressions w.r.t. time, we obtain:
;
Then, solving again (10-11) w.r.t. costates, we have:
Now, plugging (12), (13) and (15) into (14), we can rewrite the control equations as follows:
Imposing stationarity on the dynamic system D; q H ; q L ; we identify the coordinates of the unique pure-strategy open-loop Nash steady state equilibrium:
; whose eigenvalues are:
In order to ensure saddle point stability, the above eigenvalues must take di¤erent signs. A su¢ cient condition to this purpose is indeed v (1 k) > s ; whereby 1 < 0 for the assumption that < s; and 3 > 0; irrespective of the sign of 2 : It is worth noting that the positivity of 3 implies that the net growth rate of the disease must be more than o¤set by the marginal e¤ectiveness of health cares evaluated by patients belonging to the lower section of the income distribution.
It is worth noting that at the steady state, for a given price vector, (i) full market coverage does not obtain in general, and (ii) the sub-population of patients being treated become chronic, i.e., as D OL is constant but positive.
We'll come back to these issues in the next section.
An obvious complement to Proposition 1 consists in assessing the e¤ects of variations in prices on the equilibrium quality levels q OL i . 8 The relevant partial derivatives are
implying a non-monotonicity result that we may formulate in the following:
The same holds for all s 2 (0; 2cv= (2c + k)) : Inside this range, 1. for all s 2 ((1 + 2c k) v= (1 + 2c) ; 2v) ; @q
That is, in quite extreme regions where the growth rate of the disease is either much higher or much lower than the marginal e¤ectiveness of either medical care, each quality increases in its own price, all else equal. In the intermediate range, as s decreases, …rst we observe a negative e¤ect of price increases on quality levels, and then a further switch in the opposite direction. In particular, along s = v, @q OL i =@p i is negative for both …rms. Having characterised the optimal behaviour of the two …rms and the reaction of optimal qualities to any price changes, we are now in a position to investigate the objectives of the public agency in charge of regulating prices, and the consequent design of the related measures.
Regulating prices
Given the nature of the problem at hand, we can argue that the regulator should manipulate prices so as to achieve a twofold objective, namely, to ensure that (i) the entire population has access to medical care (i.e., what we usually de…ne as full market coverage), and (ii) the disease be completely eradicated, at least at the steady state equilibrium. We are about to show that there exists an admissible range for ; wherein price regulation attains both objectives at the same time, as claimed in
ensure the universality of medical cares and the eradication of the disease in steady state.
Proof. This translates into solving the system
w.r.t. p H and p L : This yields the unique pair:
with 
Finally, it is easy to verify that
The degenerate feedback game
It is well known that open-loop Nash equilibria are not, in general, subgame perfect (or strongly time consistent). Judging from the shape of the demand functions (6), the fact that x H is independent of D; while x L contains D seemingly implies that the above open-loop solution indeed is not subgame perfect because the state variable appears in the system of …rst order conditions taken on controls. We are about to prove, instead, that the present game belongs to the class of so-called state-redundant or perfect games in which open-loop equilibria are degenerate feedback ones. 9 The Bellman equation of hospital i is:
where V i (D (t)) is …rm i's value function. We are going to prove the following:
Proposition 4 For any given price vector fp H ; p L g ; the game yields a unique feedback equilibrium coinciding with the open-loop one, whereby the latter is strongly time consistent.
Proof. The …rst order conditions are:
(30) from which we obtain optimal qualities
(31) Before proceeding any further, observe that plugging the above solutions into (6) one obtains the following expressions:
Since the low-quality output is the only possible source of a quadratic term in the entire problem, if V L (D) is linear the whole game is necessarily linear in D as well, as there is no reason to suppose V H (D) to be quadratic. With this in mind, we may now turn to the explicit solution of the Bellman equations, that simplify as follows:
for …rm H; and 
Using the above functions, we may simplify the Bellman equations so as to obtain the following system:
for L. Hence, it appears that our conjecture concerning the linearity of the value functions was indeed correct. 11 The above equations are to be solved w.r.t. the unknown parameters appearing in the …rms'value functions f" H ; " L ; H ; L g : From (36) and (38), one immediately obtains " H = " L = 0, which means that the two …rms' value functions are indeed constants, i.e., V i (D) = i . Then, solving (37) and (39), we have:
Of course, the expressions appearing in (40) measure the discounted pro…t ‡ows, as the feedback equilibrium pro…ts accruing to …rm i are 
From (31), the equilibrium qualities are:
while from (6) we obtain the equilibrium output levels x
This proves indeed that the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect, 11 We have also checked the alternative possibility where the value function of i is V i (D) = i D 2 + " i D + i ; …nding that i = 0; so that the linear form obtains.
and also implies that the regulatory measures outlined in the previous section trivially extend to the feedback game. And there is more to it. As prices appear in the …rms' …rst order conditions, endogenising price regulation would require solving a Stackelberg game with the regulator in the leader's position. 
where fa; b; w; zg is a vector of real numbers, and the regulator's problem consists in determining this vector for its own purposes. Given that the objective of the regulator is to achieve D = 0 and X = 1; (43) reduces to p L = a; p H = w; where it su¢ ces to set a = p 
to attain the same price regulation policy already characterised in the openloop game, the value of both b and z being altogether immaterial.
Concluding remarks
We have modelled the interplay between vertical di¤erentiation and the endogenous evolution of a disease in a dynamic duopoly with heterogenous patients. In addition to the unicity, stability and subgame perfection of the
